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'ABSlRACT 
The recent literature on economies with an incomplete set of 
markets has been devoted to the study of the efficiency properties of 
collective stockholder decision mechanisms for guiding the behavior 01 
firms when the restrictive Ekern-Wilson spanning condition is not 
satisfied. The results have been essentially negative; a majority 
voting rule and controlling interest rules will not yield efficient 
equilibrium allocations in general. However, in a recent paper, 
Helpman and Razin (1978) suggested a decision rule that assures 
constrained Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations. Their rule 
is patterned on the recent contributions to the theory of incentive 
compatibility. In this paper, we show that an equilibrium relative to 
the Helpman-Razin .Mechanism rarely exists, making their optimality 
result essentially vacuous. We then demonstrate that an equilibrium 
does exist in general relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism developed 
by Hurwicz (1976), and that all equilibrium allocations in the 
Helpman-Razin model are constrained Pareto optima. Finally, we 
suggest that the optimality of equilibrium allocations is as much a 
consequence of how technology is modeled as of the incentives induced 
by the decision mechanism. Existence, on the other hand, is very 
sensitive in general to the decision mechanism adopted. 
COLLECTIVE DECISION MECHANISMS AND EFFICIENT S10CK MARKET ALLOCATIONS: 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent work in the theory of general equilibrium 
under uncertainty has focused on the choice of objective functions for 
guiding the behavior of firms when the set of markets in the economy 
is not complete. The literature generally is devoted to establishing 
conditions under which firms can choose production plans with the 
unanimous approval of their stockholders although some attention has 
been given to other decision mechanisms that include voting schemes 
such as majority rule or controlling interest. Until recently, the 
results of these investigations have been in the form of impossibility 
theorems; except under the very restrictive conditions consistent with 
unanimity, the proposed objectives do not achieve constrained Pareto 
optimal equilibrium stock ownership plans in general. One purpose of 
this paper is to correct this deficiency. We exhibit a collective 
decision mechanism relative to which an equilibrium stock ownership 
program does exist for a wide class of economies, which subsumes the 
unanimity model as a special case. We show that all equilibrium stock 
ownership programs are constrained Pareto optimal for the class of 
economies we consider. Our model requires that information be 
transferred between agents and formal mechanisms for achieving this 
are considered. In each of these mechanisms stockholders must at 
least be given a naive incentive to communicate truthfully if 
efficient equilibria are to be attained. 
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The general problem concerns firms' choices of production 
plans and investors' choices of a portfolio of firms' revenue shares 
in the absence of a complete set of contingent securities markets. 
There are two periods, present and future, and there are several 
possible future states of the world. There is a single commodity in 
the present which must be consumed now or invested in firms to yield 
consumption in the future. The income of each consumer (or 
stockholder) is a fixed share of random profits plus some fixed 
nonrandom income. Any objective function a firm may use must reflect 
the tastes of is stockholders if efficiency is to be achieved. Dreze 
(1974) has shown that production efficiency will be attained if each 
firm maximizes its value to the stockholders. Necessarily, the firm's 
value to stockholders is a function of each stockholder's marginal 
rate of substitution between second period random consumption and 
first period certain consumption, which is the individual's implicit 
contingent claim price, weighted by his or her relative shareholding. 
Thus, for firms to make efficient decisions, they must know or be able 
to learn final stockholders' true contingent claim prices. To assume 
that firms know stockholders' contingent claim prices is not 
satisfactory, and to assume that consumers are pure competitors in the 
stockmarket, taking firms' prevailing revenue share prices as given, 
does not eliminate this information problem for those firms concerned 
with making efficient decisions. 
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One approach to this problem is to let the final stockholders 
of each firm become participants in the firm's decision process, 
making a collective production decision. Conceptually, the firm is 
then like a large cooperative or partnership, and the principal 
difficulty becomes the design of a voting or collective decision 
procedure that yields efficient equilibria which exist for an 
interesting class of economies.1 Gevers (1974) and Jordan (1979) have
observed, respectively, that a majority voting rule and a controlling 
interest voting rule are logically inconsistent with constrained 
Pareto optimality in general.2 This problem vanishes, however, if 
stockholders are unanimous in their preferences. 
Unanimity prevails if and only if the Ekern-Wilson (1974) 
spanning condition is satisfied. Loosely stated, the spanning 
condition requires that any small adjustment in stockholders ' returns 
achievable by altering firms' production plans must also be achievable 
by portfolio changes. In short, the set of available state­
distributions of returns cannot be affected by firms' decisions. That 
is, the value of any change in the production plans must equal the 
cost of making the corresponding portfolio change. Since the latter 
cost is calculated from observable market values, it is the same for 
all stockholders. Therefore, each firm's manager can use his own 
preferences when selecting a production plan, and an efficient 
allocation will be obtained. But, the spanning condition is highly 
restrictive since it is not satisfied in many nonpathological 
economies. 
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An alternative approach is that suggested by Helpman and Razin 
(1978). If consumers are pure competitors in the stock market, then 
firms' revenue shares can be allocated with a price mechanism; a 
collective decision procedure is to be used to determine the 
distribution of firms' production costs among stockholders as well as 
firms' input-output levels. The decision rule, based on a mixture of 
an I-player noncooperative game and ordinary competition, plays a role 
that is conceptually similar to � but different in application from 
� collective choice mechanisms for achieving Pareto efficient public 
good allocations in private ownership economies with complete markets 
and no uncertainty. What is extraordinary about the Helpman-Razin 
decision mechanism is their rule for distributing firms' costs among 
stockholders. 
An equilibrium in the Helpman-Razin model -- called a 
participation equilibrium � is a Nash noncooperative equilibrium 
relative to their decision mechanism. Firms' state-dependent 
technologies are given, and each stockholder is asked to communicate 
the increment (or decrement) of each firm's input he or she would like 
to add to (or subtract from) the amount requested by the other 
stockholders. The input level selected by each firm is the sum of the 
increments (or decrements) communicated by all stockholders. Clearly, 
the resulting equilibrium input levels must be those most desired by 
stockholders. The Helpman-Razin cost sharing rule assesses each 
consumer in the economy a preassigned and fixed equal share of the 
economy's aggregate production costs plus a personalized lump sum 
transfer. They then show that an equilibrium allocation is a 
constrained Pareto optimum. 
Since llelpman and Razin do not rely on the Ekern-Wilson 
spanning condition to prove optimality of equilibrium allocations, 
their theorem has considerable appeal. However, it is significant 
that a participation equilibrium relative to the Helpman-Razin 
decision mechanism usually will not exist even if the spanning 
condition is satisfied � making their optimality result essentially 
vacuous. The general nonexistence of a participation equilibrium 
relative to their mechanism is a consequence of their cost sharing 
rule. Indeed, as long as the cost shares are preassigned and fixed, 
an equilibrium will not exist in general. 
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If the cost sharing rules are changed, then so is the 
incentive structure of the decision mechanism, and the question to be 
asked is whether there is a collective decision mechanism that 
maintains the desired incentive structure and relative to which a 
participation equilibrium exists for a general class of economies. A 
natural mechanism to consider is the Shareholding Mechanism which 
equates stockholders' cost and revenue shares. Leland (1973)  has 
shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium 
with the Shareholding Mechanism is the Ekern-Wilson spanning 
condition, 3 so it should not be surprising that this mechanism can
only work for a highly restricted class of economies. 
Another candidate that does work for a general class of 
economies is the Shared Cost Mechanism developed by Hurwicz (197 6). 
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The Shared Cost Mechanism is in the spirit of both the Helpman-Razin 
and Shareholding Mechanisms. However, the stockholders' cost shares 
are not exogenous and fixed nor are they necessarily equal to the 
stockholders'  revenue shares; rather the cost shares are choice 
variables for each stockholder. Relative to the Shared Cost 
Mechanism, a participation equilibrium exists for general 
stockholders' ownership economies and equilibrium stock ownership 
programs are constrained Pareto optima. 
In the next section, we present the general model. We also 
consider examples for which there are no participation equilibria 
relative to the Helpman-Razin Mechanism or the Shareholding Mechanism, 
but for which equilibria relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism can be 
demonstrated. In section 3, we prove that a participation equilibrium 
relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism exists for a general class of 
economies, and we show that the equilibrium allocations are efficient. 
To prove existence, we define the notion of a full stock.holders 
equilibrium. and show that such equilibria exist. We then demonstrate 
that the set of full stockholders equilibria is the set of 
participation equilibria relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism. A 
point of interest is that a full stockholders  equilibrium in stock 
ownership economies is structurally the same as a Lindahl equilibrium 
in private ownership economies with public goods. 
Within the context of our model, the set of full stockholders 
equilibria is also the set of stockholders equilibria as defined by 
Dreze (1974). It follows that Dreze stockholders' equilibrium 
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allocations are efficient. In section 4, we reconcile this conclusion 
with the apparently contrary result proven by Dreze (1974) for 
similarly specified economies by showing that the two models have a 
very important difference in how technologies are specified across 
states of nature. It is this difference rather than the incentive 
structure induced by the decision mechanism that drives the optimality 
result, both here and in the original Helpman-Razin formulation. 
However, the use of a decision mechanism like the Shared Cost 
Mechanism sidesteps the implicit contingent claim price revelation 
questions that arise otherwise. Thus, permitting an individual's 
revenue share to differ from his cost share allows us to characterize 
a wide class of economies in which stockholders equilibria are 
constrained Pareto optimal. Our conclusions are discussed more fully 
in section S. 
2. THE MODEL
The model we consider is a stock ownership economy consisting 
of I consumers, indexed i = 1, • • •  , I, and J firms, indexed j = 1, • • •  , J. 
There are two periods of time labeled 0 and 1, respectively. There 
are S possible mutually exclusive states of the world that can occur 
in period 1, indexed s = 1, . • •  , S. Which of these occurs is not known 
in period O. 
A consumption plan for consumer i is a nonnegative vector 
ci = (ciO'cil , • • • , ciS) e R
s+l h d . f . .+ , w ere ciO enotes consumption o 1 1n
period 0 and cis is the consumption of i in period 1 if state s
obtains. The consumption set of i is the nonnegative orthant, RS+l + .
Further, we assume that the preferences of consumer i are 
representable by a utility function Ui(ci) which is defined over the
consumption set. 
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Each consumer i is endowed with wi units of a good in period 0
which may be used for current consumption or invested in firms to 
yield future consumption. Consumer i is also endowed with a revenue 
share& .. of each firm j, where 0 < & . . < 1 and LS .. = 1 all j i J. 1J - 1J- 1 1J 
Let &i = (eij' j i J). 
A production plan for firm j is a vector 
yj = (xj, yj1, . • •  , yjS) B R,!+1 where xj denotes the input of firm j in
period 0 and yjs denotes the output of firm j in period 1 if state s
occurs. We further assume that the choice of input completely 
determines the level of each firm's output in each state. That is, we 
assume that each firm's technology is representable by a set of state 
specific production functions R. (x.), all s, j. JS J 
A stock ownership economy will be denoted by 
E = {(Ui(·},w.,9., i i I),(R . ( · ) . s i S, j < J)}. We assume, 1 1 JS -
Al: for each i, Ui(·) is a twice continuously differentiable
semi-strictly quasi-concave function4 such that
. i s+l � ) O _air: ) O for all s and for all c. e R+ ;a , ac. 1 cio 1s 
A2: for each j and each s, R. (x.) is a twice continuously JS J 
aR. 
differentiable concave function such that � ) O for allax. J 
s and all xj e R+.
To include a framework in the model for explicitly analyzing 
alternative managerial decision procedures that utilize information 
collected from stockholders, we formulate the investment and 
production decisions for each firm j as a non-cooperative I-person 
game among stockholders. The firms use information received from 
stockholders to compute input levels and individual stockholder cost 
shares. These computations are made according to an allocation rule 
and stockholder cost sharing rules. Messages which stockholders may 
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communicate to each firm are restricted to a particular message space. 
The message space, allocation rule and stockholder cost sharing rules 
for each firm together comprise a stylized managerial decision 
mechanism for the firm. Collectively, the firms' decision mechanisms 
define a managerial decision mechanism for the stock ownership 
economy. Formally, 
Definition 2.1: A managerial decision mechanism G in an economy E is 
defined by: (i) a message space M; (ii) an allocation rule 
f(-) = C f1 C - ), • • •  , f1(·)):M1-> R1; (iii) individual cost sharing rules
C. :M1-> RJ for each ii I.1 
To provide for consumption in period 1, individual i chooses a 
portfolio of revenue shares &i to hold in period 1, entitling him or
her to the corresponding fractions of firms' outputs in period 1. 
Individual i then pays (or receives) p(e. - 0.) where 1 1 
p = (p., J· < J); p. denotes the market value of firm j. J - J 
Each individual desires a portfolio &i and input levels
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xi= (xi1 , • • .  ,xiJ) that are feasible which maximize his or  her 
utility. Thus, given a managerial decision mechanism G, the decision 
problem of individual i is 
to maximize Ui(c)
(c i' 9 i' mi)
subject to 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
c.0 + � p.9 .. + l C .. (m) i w. + l p.9 .. ,1 J 1J J 1J 1 J J 1J 
ci i L R- (f.(m))9 .. , si S,s J J s J 1J 
i e M, m 
0i. 1 o. x. 1 o. j i J,J J 
ciO l 0, cis l 0, s i S. 
We assume that each stockholder is competitive in the stock 
market and with respect to messages communicated by other 
stockholders. That is, we assume, 
A3: Each stockholder i considers prices p e R! and the messages
1-1 of other stockholders m_i = (m:i_ •• • • ,mi-l'mi+l•···•m1) e M 
as given. 
In this formulation, a competitive equilibrium is a Nash 
noncooperative equilibrium relative to the decision mechanism G, given 
the prevailing price system. Such an equilibrium is called a 
participation equilibrium. 
Definition 2.2: A participation equilibrium in an economy E relative 
to a decision mechanism G is a price system p e R!, a consumption
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allocation Ci= (ci,i i I), a portfolio allocation 9
a vector of messages m = (m., i i I) e 111 such that
(9i, i i I) and
1 
( i) for each i i I, (ci,9i,mi) is a solution to
stockholder i's decision problem given prices p, the 
mechanism G, and the messages of other stockholders 
m . •  -1 
( ii) l c iO + l f · ( m) = l .., i •1 J J 1 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
f. (m) J = xj, j i J, 
ll 1 J cij(m) = l xj• j i JJ 
and 
� 9ij l , ji J.s
In this formulation of decision making in stock ownership 
economies, managers are just functionaries that implement the 
decisions of stockholders given the managerial decision mechanism G. 
Choosing a firm production plan is a collective decision for 
stockholders, and any production plan implemented must be acceptable 
to each stockholder given the feasible alternatives under the decision 
mechanism. Thus, a firm's production plan is an equilibrium plan only 
if it is unanimously supported by all stockholders given the 
corresponding cost sharing arrangement. This unanimity property is, 
in general, dependent on transfers between stockholders implicit from 
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the equilibrium revenue share holdings and cost sharing arrangements. 
It follows that our model is a generalization of the simple unanimity 
model examined by Leland (1973) and Ekern-Wilson (1974) which requires 
cost shares and revenue shares to be identical for all stockholders 
and thus does not permit transfers between them. Since uncertainty 
may be � but is not restricted to being �multiplicative, the 
Diamond (1967) model is subsumed as a special case as well. 
Perhaps the most natural mechanism to consider is the 
Shareholding Mechanism which assesses each stockholder cost shares 
equal to his revenue shares. Under this mechanism, each stockholder 
is asked to communicate an increment (or decrement) that he or she 
would like added to (or subtracted from) the input level of each firm 
desired by other stockholders as reflected by their messages given the 
allocation rule. Thus, in equilibrium, the resulting input levels are 
those most desired by all stockholders given the prevailing price 
system and the cost sharing rules. Formally, we define the mechanism 
as follows: 
Definition 2.3: The Shareholding Mechanism is given by: (i) the 
message space M = R1; (ii) the allocation rule x. = ) m .. , for each J t � 
j < J; and (iii) the cost functions C(m) = (C .. (m), J. < J) where- � -
Ci/m) = 9ij � �j"
Unfortunately, the existence of an equilibrium under the Shareholding 
Mechanism cannot be assured, as the following example illustrates. 
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Example 1 Consider an economy with two consumers, one firm, and two 
states of the world. Let �(x) = x
1/2 and Rz<x) = x, and define for 
each i, 
uicci0'cil,ci2) 
1/2 cpi 1/2 + picl/2)ciO lcil 2 i2 
It is easy to see that we must have an interior solution in 
equilibrium: if either x = 0 or 9i = 0, then cis = 0, s = 1,2, and 
aui<c. > . 1S > since ac. -1S 
� as cis 
-> 0 for i = 1,2, s = 1,2, we may 
immediately rule out corner solutions. The necessary first order 
conditions with respect to 9i and mi require
p + x 
ciO 
.,i 1/2+.,i 1/2 
"'lcil "'2ci2 
,..1
x 
,..
2
x [ .,i 1/2 .,i l
xl/49!
/2 
+
xl/29�
/2 
� 
9i 
for all i
and 
1 
ciO 
picl/2+picl/2 1 il 2 i2 
[ Pi P� l 
2(cilx)
l/2 + c��
2
ciO [ <Pi
_
+ 2P�x
l/4> l
9. . 1 2x(p1 + p1xl/4) 1 1 
Substituting for � in (2.2) from (2.1) gives
1 
for all i (2.2) 
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1 (p + x) 2 [ p� + 2plxl/4 l
2x (p� + p�x
l/ 4) 
for each i. (2 .3) 
Solving (2.3) for p gives 
p 
( P 
i+2 A i 1/ 4 
' i
1 J'2x ) 
ixpl 1,2 (2.4) 
and, since both stockholders must agree on an input level satisfying 
(2 .4) • 
or 
1
xpl
Cp �+2p�x
l/ 4>
2xpl
<Pi+2p�xl/ 4>
2 1 <P2P1 P�Pi>x5/4 0 (2.5) 
It is now apparent that, for arbitrary p1 F p2, s = 1,2, (2.5) cans s 
only be satisfied if x = O. However, as demonstrated above, this 
input level cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, no equilibrium relative 
to the Shareholding Mechanism exists for this economy.II 
The Shareholding Mechanism is essentially a formalization of 
the decision procedure consistent with the simple unanimity model 
within the context of our more general model. Therefore, Example 1 
should not be surprising since there are economies in the class 
permitted by Al and A2 that do not satisfy the Ek.ern-Wilson spanning 
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condition. However, Example 1 does make clear that the difficulty 
with the Shareholding Mechanism stems from the fact that the portfolio 
holdings of each individual must perform two distinct purposes. They 
determine each individual's pattern of consumption across states of 
the world, and also the share of cost each consumer must incur when 
making input decisions. 
Helpman and Razin suggest an alternative mechanism which is a 
step towards separating these two functions. In particular, they 
assign exogenous cost shares to each consumer which will not in 
general coincide with portfolio holdings. Their mechanism is given 
by: 
Definition 2.4: The Helpman-Razin Mechanism is defined by: (i) the 
message space M = R3"; (ii) the allocation rule x. = } m .. , for eachJ t � 
j i J; and (iii) the individual cost functions Ci(m) (Ci/m), j i J) 
Cij(mj) = t � mhj for each i and j.6
The difficulty that arises here is that an equilibrium rarely 
exists under this mechanism for a wide class of regular economies. 
This is due to the fact that the cost shares have been preassigned, 
a .. = !.1, for each i and j. This is demonstrated in the following two lJ 
examples. 
Example 2 Consider the class of economies with two consumers, two 
firms and two states of the world where 
�l(xl) = xl, �2(xl) = 2x1• �l(x2) = x2, �2(x2) 2x2, and
Ui(ciO'cil,ci2) 
i i ciO + P1log cil + P2log ci2'
pi + pi=l pi > 0 for s1 2 ' s 1,2 and i 1,2. 
Each consumer maximizes his utility subject to 
c iO + l P / ij + t } l mhj i w i + l P j a ijJ t J J 
c. i l R. (} mh.)6 . . • 1S J JS fi J 1J 
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The necessary first order conditions with respect to input 
proposals, m .. , are� 
!. 
= 
2P1 + _h e 
[ i i ] 
2 cil c12 il• 
for i 1,2 
1 P1 2P2 
[ i i ]
:T 
= cil 
+ ci2 
ei2' for i = 1,2
• 
(2.6a) 
(2.6b) 
Similarly, the necessary first order conditions with respect to & . .
� 
are [2Pt P� ] 
P1 = cil 
+ ci2 
xl' for i 1,2 (2.7a) 
[ Pt 2p� JP2 = cil + ci2 x2, for i 1,2 (2.7b) 
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Combining (2.6a) with (2.7a) and (2.6b) with (2.7b) it is easily seen 
that 
p. 1 . . .:..i = --, for 1 = 1,2 and Jx. 26 .. J 1J 
1,2 
and multiplying this by 6 .. and summing over both individuals gives 1J 
p. = x. which requires that &i. = 1/2. Further, multiplying (2.6a) byJ J J 
x1 and (2.6b) by x2 and summing gives x1 + x2 = 2. Thus, making use
of these substitutions in (2.6a) and (2.6b) gives 
2pi 1 - 1 + 2 - 2xl + x2 
i1 - P1
x1 + 2x2
i . !. 
= 
P1 
+ 
2(1 - pi> 
2 2xl + X2 xi + 2x2
Multiplying (2.Sb) by two and subtracting from (2.Sa) gives 
1 3 ( 1 - pt
> 
2 = x1 + 2x2
and using this, together with the fact that x1 + x2
and 
X1 = 2(3Pt - 1)
x2 = 2(2 - 3Pt>
2 gives 
(2 .Sa) 
(2.Sb) 
This can only be satisfied in the event that both individuals have 
identical utility functions, i.e., P� = P� for j = 1,2. In this case J J 
all individuals will be unanimous in their preferences over input 
decisions and this choice becomes trivial. In all other cases, a 
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competitive equilibrium under a Helpman-Razin Mechanism will not 
exist. Since the set of parameters for which p1 = p2, s = 1,2 hass s 
measure zero in the class of allowable parameters, non-existence of an 
equilibrium relative to the Helpman-Razin Mechanism is generic for the 
class of regular economies defined by this example.7 
As one additional remark, it should be noted that there is a 
complete set of contingent claim markets in Example 2 yet no 
equilibrium exists.II 
Example la Consider the economy specified in Example 1. Let 
w1 = 4/3, w2 = 1, 91 = 92 = 1/2, and p� = P� = 1/2, i = 1,2. The
necessary first order conditions under the Helpman-Razin Mechanism 
with respect to &i and mi are 
and 
p = .:w. e. 
1 
[ 1/4 ] 1 + 2;s; 1/2 = ciO 1/4) 2x(l + x 
for all i (2.9) 
for all i (2.10) 
Summing (2.10) over both individuals and making use of the fact that 
{ ciO = { wi - x = 7/3 - x gives
1 (7/3 - x) [ 1 + 2;s;l/4 l 
2x(l + xl/4) 
19 
and it may be verified that the only solution to this equation which 
is feasible, i.e., x e [O,{ wi]' is given by x = 1. Substituting this
into equation (2.10) gives c10 = c20 = 2/3 and, from (2.9), p = 4/3
and el 62 1/2. Recall that individual 2's budget constraint in
period 0 is 
c20 + p&2 + x/2 i w2 + p62 1 + 2/3 S/3.
However, the allocation requires this individual to spend 
c20 + p&2 + x/2 = 2/3 + 2/3 + 1/2 = 11/6. Since this allocation is 
not affordable, no equilibrium will exist for the economy in this 
example. I I
Note that although individuals have identical preferences in 
this example, there may not exist an equilibrium under the Helpman-
Razin Mechanism if individuals have different endowments. 
Another ''natural'' mechanism would be to have initial 
shareholders bear the input costs in proportion to their endowed 
holdings, & . . • This is nothing more than a special case of the� 
Helpman-Razin Mechanism where a .. =& .. is set exogenously. From� � 
Example la it may be seen that an equilibrium will still fail to exist 
in general. 
In principle, the Helpman-Razin Mechanism is focused in the 
proper direction since it separates ownership shares from cost shares. 
However, both the Shareholding Mechanism and the Helpman-Razin 
Mechanism employ linear cost sharing functions which, in general, do 
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not permit sufficient flexibility in the assignment of costs 
corresponding to individual consumption levels, given here by the 
revenue share holdings and production plans, to ensure existence of an 
equilibrium. This difficulty derives from the public good nature of 
firms' production decisions, and is basically the same problem that 
was identified by Groves-Ledyard (1977) for allocation mechanisms in 
Arrow-Debreu private ownership economies with public goods. Groves-
Ledyard (1977, 1980) circumvented this difficulty by introducing a 
public good allocation mechanism with non-linear (quadratic) cost 
sharing functions where the selection of cost shares is endogenous in 
the model.8 The efficient public good allocation mechanisms suggested 
by Hurwicz (1976) (the Shared Cost Mechanism) and Walker (1981) (the 
Paired Difference Mechanism)9 also use non-linear cost sharing 
functions and the selection of cost shares are again endogenous in the 
mechanism, 
This suggests that such mechanisms should solve the stock 
ownership allocation problem as well, an observation that is indeed 
correct. Any of the three mechanisms is easily applied to stock 
ownership economies using the general model presented above, and major 
properties of the mechanisms in public good economies carry over to 
stock ownership economies, With any of these mechanisms, an efficient 
equilibrium exists even if stockholders behave strategically, In the 
remainder of the paper, we focus on the Shared Cost Mechanism. 
However, in our concluding remarks, we note those similarities and 
differences that arise from application of the other mechanisms. 
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Definition 2.S: The Shared Cost Mechanism is defined by: (i) a message 
space M = fl?-J where mi = (xij 'aij'j i J) e M for all ii I; (ii) an
allocation rule x. = � x .. J 1J' for j i J; and (iii) a set of cost
functions C.(m) = (C .. (m), j i J) where1 1J 
C . .  (m) = (1 - � ak.)x. + (1 - � ak.)2, for each i and j.1J i J J J 
The interpretation given to this mechanism is that the 
component aij of each message mij is the share of cost which
individual i is willing to transfer to others. In equilibrium, 
however, � ajk = 1, for each j, since aij affects an individual i only
through the term (1 - � akj)2 and thus the cost which he incurs can be
decreased without changing xj merely by changing aij if � akj I 1.
Thus, in equilibrium a .. becomes the share of the input cost of firm j1J 
which is transferred to individual i. 
To interpret this mechanism in terms of the general 
stockholders problem, we imagine stockholders and firm managers coming 
together in a stockholders' meeting where production plans are to be 
selected and stockholders' cost shares assigned. Each firm's manager 
announces that these decisions will be made according to the Shared 
Cost Mechanism which is designed to function in the stockholders' 
interests. Then management polls stockholders by secret ballot, 
asking that each stockholder communicate desired incremental changes 
in the previously announced tentative production plans and the share 
of production costs each stockholder would like transferred to others. 
Stockholders are permitted to trade shares on the stock market at 
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prevailing prices even as new tentative production plans are being 
announced; a firm ' s  stock prices are revised upward (downward) by a 
market auctioneer if there is an excess demand (supply) for the firm's 
shares. The stockholders' meetings are adjourned and the stock market 
closed when an equilibrium decision is signaled by no change in any 
stockholder's ballot or proposal to trade on the stock market. 
In the next section, ve consider the general equilibrium 
properties of the Shared Cost .Mechanism in stock ownership economies. 
In particular, ve provide a proof of the existence of a participation 
equilibrium relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism. Prior to doing 
this, however, ve show that the previously considered examples have 
equilibria relative to this mechanism. 
Example lb Consider the economy specified in Example 1 .  Further let 
w1 = 21/10 and w2 = 2/ 10 and let e1 = e2 = 1/2. We also wish to
specify the parameters in the utility functions by p� = P� = 1/2 and
Pi = 1/3,  Pi = 2/3 .  The necessary first order conditions under the
Shared Cost Mechanism with respect to ei' ai' and xi are
and 
p=�e. • 
1 
ai = 1 - k�i ak,
a. 
1 
1 - ) a. 
kf=i J 
ciO . 
2 [ Pf+2p ixl/ 4 l
2x(p1+"i 1/4 
• 
1 .. 2x )
It may be verified that the following allocation is an equilibrium 
under the Shared Cost .Mechanism: 
cl (1,10/13,10/13 ), c2 (3/10, 3 / 13 ,  3 / 13 )
e1 10/13 ,  e2 = 3 /13 ,  x = 1, p = 13/10
a1 = 3/4, a2 = 1/4.
This example points up the need of allowing cost shares to vary 
endogenously independently of ownership shares since, as can be 
seen,e1 f. � and e2 f. � .11
Example 2a: Consider the economy specified in Example 2. Let 
wl = 2. w2 = 3 ,  elj = e2j = 1/2, j = 1,2 and
P� = P� = 1/ 2, Pi = 1/3,  P� = 2/3 .  The necessary first order
conditions under the Shared Cost Mechanism with respect to e .. are� 
given in (2.6) and the ones with respect to e .. and x . .  are1J 1J 
aij
aij
1 - � a . 
k i kj' J
(1 - ) ak. )kf=i J 
1 ,2  
(2p�/ cil + p�/ ci2> eij' i = 1,2
a .. = 1 - ) akJ. 
[ Pf 2P� l 
= -+- e cil ci2 i2' 
i 1,2  • 1J k1i 
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It may be verified that, for this example, an equilibrium is given by 
cl (1,3 / 2,3/ 2), c2 (2,1,2)
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au all 1, 621 �l 1/3, P1 xl 1/2. 
612 = �2 = O, 622 = a22 
2/3, p2 = x2 = 3/2. 
This example demonstrates that the Shared Cost Mechanism continues to 
perform satisfactorily when there are complete markets. The reader 
may verify that the Shareholding Mechanism also chooses the same 
allocation whereas for the Helpman-Razin Mechanism, an equilibrium 
does not exist, as was previously demonstrated.II 
3 • EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY 
In this section, we prove that a participation equilibrium 
relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism exists for the class of 
economies given by assumptions Al, A2 and A3. We show too that an 
equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto optimal, and that each 
constrained Pareto optimal allocation can be implemented as a 
participation equilibrium (the two Fundamental Welfare Theorems). To 
prove existence, we appeal to an existence theorem established by 
Dreze (1974). We proceed by first reviewing his definition of a 
stockholders equilibrium, then we define a full stockholders 
equilibrium and show that every stockholders equilibrium can be 
supported as a full stockholders equilibrium. Finally we show that a 
full stockholders equilibrium can be implemented as a participation 
equilibrium using the Shared Cost Mechanism. A full stockholders 
equilibrium is the analog for stock ownership economies of a Lindahl 
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equilibrium in private ownership economies with public goods, and 
their similarity establishes a definitive analytical link between 
stock ownership economies and public good economies. We conclude the 
section with the Fundamental Welfare Theorems. 
3 .1. Existence 
A stock ownership program is a vector 
z = (x,c,9) e a!+I(S+l+J) consisting of firms' input levels 
x = (xj,j i J), stockholders consumptions c = (ciO'cis's i S,i i I) 
and revenue shares 9 = (9.,i i I) = (e . . ,j i J, ii I). Let 1 � 
Z c R�+I(S+l+J) denote the set of attainable stock ownership programs, 
and let w = � wi and x = (xj,j i J). Following Dreze (1974), define 
for each z e Z, 
Fj ( �) {z e ZI� � for k � j and e &1 (3.1) 
{z e zll c.o + x. i w - ) �-
1 1 J k�j , 
cis - eijRjs (xj) i 
)
. Sik�s(;k),i i I, s i SJ for each j i J, �J 
E(�) {z e zlx ;} 
{z e zll ciO i w - l ij;cis - l &ijRjs(�j) i O, 1 J J 
ii I,s i S; L a .. 
1 1J 
l,j i J;& L. O}. 
(3.2) 
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Fj(i) is the set of stock ownership programs attainable from a given
starting point i through decisions of the jth firm and adjustments in
current consumptions, the input plans of other firms being given. 
E(i) is the set of stock ownership programs attainable from the 
starting point i through exchanges of revenue shares accompanied by
adjustments in current consumptions, the input levels of all firms 
being given. Notice that E(i) is also the set of feasible allocations 
for a pure exchange economy t<i> = {(Wi(·), i i I),w} where the
commodities are revenue shares &i and current consumptions
A '\A i - i "\ A ciO' w = w - L xj and W (ciQ'&i) = U (ciO' L Rjs(xj)&ij' s i S) for eachJ J 
ii I. 
Definition 3.1. A pseudo equilibrium for firm j relative to z is a 
stock ownership program z• e Fj(z) and a set of I vectors
• n. a 1 
• RS+l 
+ 
• niO = 1 such that 
i i • • • • (i) U (c.) > U (ci) implies nic .  > n .c. for each i < I;1 1 1 1 -
(ii) . ' "\ . . x. maximizes LR. (x .)L & .. n .  J S JS J 1 1J 1S 
x . •J 
Definition 3 .2. A price equilibrium for the economy t(z) is a stock 
• • l+ J • ownership program z• e E(z) and a price vector (p0, p  ) e R+ • Po . . . . . such that W1(c. 0 ,&.) > W
1(c.0 ,&.) implies c .0 + p e.1 1 1 1 1 1
• • • ciO + p ei.
• Definition 3,3.  A stock ownership program z e Z is a stockholders
equilibrium if and only if 
1 
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( i) there exist I vectors n� such that (z*; n�.i <I) is1 1 -
a pseudo equilibrium for firm j relative to z*, each
j i J; 
(ii) • • there exists a price vector (p0, p  ) such that
(z.;(p�.p•)) is a price equilibrium for �(z*). 
Dreze (197 4, p. 144) proves that 
Theorem 3 .1. (Dreze) Under assumptions Al and A2, if w > 0, then 
there exists a stockholders equilibrium. 
Dreze also shows that, under differentiability, 
. "\ . . Pj 2. L nisRjs(xj)s 
all i.j, 
. . "\ . . . pj&ij = L nisRjs(xj)eij s 
all i.j,
(3.3)  
(3.4) 
. "\ . . . so that p .  > L n R. (x. ) in equilibrium only if & .. J S 1S JS J 1J 
O. Further, 
• nis
auic c �> 
1 
acis
auic c �> 
I __ ....__ aciO
each i, s. (3.5) 
The Dreze framework, given by (3.1),(3.2) and Definitions 3.1 
- 3.3 ,  does not provide for a distribution of production costs among 
the I stockholders. That is, Dreze does not consider directly the 
question of production financing, a question we must consider to prove 
existence of a participation equilibrium since the distribution of 
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production costs and its impact on the incentive structure are 
integral parts of the problem. Therefore, to invoke Dreze's existence 
theorem, we must extend the concept of a stockholder equilibrium to 
include the distribution of production costs among stockholders, 
incorporating the input levels of firms that are willingly financed by 
stockholders into the definition as stockholder decision variables. 
Let Vi(ciO'&i, x): U
i(cio>l Rj8(xj)&ij' s  i S).
J 
Definition 3.4. A stock ownership program z• e Z, a vector of prices 
• • 1� • (p0.p ) e R+ , Po = 1 and a vector of stockholders' cost shares
• • • 
a = (ai, i  i I) = (aij' j i 1, i i I) is a full stockholders equilibrium 
• l+S • if and only if there exist I vectors ni a R+ , niO = 1 such that
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
. . . . . .U1(ci) > U
1(ci) implies nici > nici;. . . . . 
V1(ciO'&i, x) > V
1(ciO'&i, x  ) implies
* • • • • • • ciO + P ei + aix > ciO + P ei + aix ;
• for each j i 1, x. maximizes 
J 
2 • • • nisRjs(xj)eij - aijxj each ii I;s 
• • • • • -ciO + P ei + aix = wi + p ei each i i I; 
} a� . = 1 each j i 1;
1 J 
} &� . = 1 each j i 1; 
1 1J 
Definition 3 .4  is a straightforward generalization of 
Definition 3.3.  Condition (i) says that individually preferred points 
must have a greater consumption value to the stockholder, condition 
(ii) requires that any individually preferred action entail an 
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increase in individual costs, and condition (iii) requires that 
equilibrium production costs be distributed among stockholders in such 
a way as to make the jth firm's production decision maximal for each
• • stockholder given his revenue share &ij' cost share a .. and implicit1J • contingent claim prices ni. Conditions (iv), (v) and (vi) are just
feasibility and market clearing conditions. Now assume 
A4: Each stockholder i is competitive with respect to his cost 
shares ai and revenue share prices Cp0,p). 
Theorem 3 .2, If w > 0, then there exists a full stockholders 
equilibrium under assumptions Al, A2, and A4. 
Proof: To prove the theorem, we must show there is a nonnegative 
. . . . . . . . . . . vector (z , (p0, p  ), (ai, 1  i I), (ni, 1  i I)) that sat1sf1es cond1t1ons
(i)-(vi) of definition 3 .4. 
• Let z s Z be a stockholders equilibrium, and let 
• • • • (p0, p  ), (ni, i  i I) be the vectors corresponding to z in accordance
with definitions 3.1 - 3 . 3 .  • • • The existence of z , (p0), (ni, i  i I) is
guaranteed by Theorem 3.1.  
Define for each i i I ,  j i 1, 
&.1 
• a ..1J 
• 
&i. 
• 
_ "\ • dRjs(xj) • 
- L nis dx 9ij's 
(3. 6) 
(3.7)  
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w. 1 
• • • ciO + aix (3.8) 
(i) and (vi) follow immediately from Iheorem 3 .1. To 
establish (iii) and (v), we note that 
l a=j 1 = ) l 1!. l s is • 9ij = 1 for each j 
by (3.7), Iheorem 3 .1 and Definition 3.1  (ii). Since 
'\ • dR;s<x;
) • . . . . 
L n. d 9 .. 1s nonnegat1ve and monotone non-1ncreas1ng as x. S 1S Xj 1J J 
• increases for all i, j, there exist unique a .. , i  < I  for each 3· i I 1J -
• 
• _ '\ • dRj8(xj) • such that ai. -L n. d 9i. J S 1S Xj J 
(iv) follows from (3. 6) and (3.8). To establish (ii), we note 
that, 
. aui<c.) 1 1 dV (ci0'9i, x) = ac._ dciO 
+ l au
i<c.) 
s acis 
[l dR. (x. )  1 s 1 dx. J J 
+ l Rjs(xj)d9ij ] ) 0 J 
9 ijdxj 
implies by hypothesis and (3.5 ), 
• 
• '\ '\ • dR;s<
x
;
) • • (ciO - ciO) ) LL llis dx. 9ij (xj - xj) J s J 
'\ '\ . . . +LL nisRjs(xj) ceij - 9ij) • J s 
Bence, by (3 .3), (3 .4) and (3.7), 
• 
• • '\ '\ dR. (x.) • • ciO + p 9i ) ciO + L L llis !!. 1 9ij (xj - xj) 
and therefore, 
J s J 
'\ 
'\ . . . . +LL n. R. ex.> ce .. - e .. ) + p 9. J S 1S JS J 1J 1J 1 
• • • • • 
2. ciO + ai(x - x) + p ei' 
• • • • • • • I ciO + p ei + aiX ) ciO + p ei + aix • I 
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Ihe next theorem establishes that the set of full stockholders 
equilibrium allocations is also the set of participation equilibrium 
allocations relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism. 
Iheorem 3 .3. • • • • (z ,(p0, p  ), a ) is a full stockholders equilibrium 
under assumptions Al, A2 ,  A4 if and only if there exist messages 
mi= (xi, ai) e R
21• ii I, current consumption-revenue share bundles 
(ci0'9i) 2. 0, i i I and prices (�, q) e 
l+J R+ such that 
((mi, ci0'9i), ii I; (�, q)) is a participation equilibrium relative 
to the Shared Cost Mechanism under assumptions Al, A2, A3, where 
'\ 
. . 4 xij = xj' ciO = ciO' 9i 1 
(�,q) 
• • 
(Po•P ). 
• 
9 i' 
• 
=1 - J �J0' a.. . 1J 1 for all i, j, and 
3 2  
Proof: Given x = (xij'i i I, j i J) ,
R11 be any vector such that x .. 
let x• = l xi' and given x•. let1 
x 8 1J x; - >. xij each j i. J.b¥J 
Observe that, in equilbrium, ai. = 1 - } 8h· for each j i J sinceJ ll¥i J 
the message component aij affects stockholder i only through the term 
(1 - ' 8hj)2 and thus i can decrease his cost share, thereby
increasing c.0 simply by changing a .. if
) a. .  I 1, any j, Hence, we1 1J ' ilJ 
may 
ciO 
• let a . . = a .. all i, j. The theorem follows by letting1J 1J 
• • • • 
= ciO' &i = &i and (�, q) = (p0, p  ), since the alternative
competitive assumptions, A3 and A4, imply the same incentives exist in 
both systems with respect to prices and cost shares.II 
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 prove that, 
Theorem 3 .4. (Existence) Under assumptions Al-A3, if w > 0, then 
there exists a participation equilibrium relative to the Shared Cost 
Mechanism. 
3 ,2. Optimality and Unbiasedness 
An appropriate concept of efficiency for economies with 
incomplete markets is constrained Pareto optimality. Pareto 
optimality cannot be achieved in general because stockholders cannot 
contract for revenue shares in the first period contingent on the 
state of the world that occurs in the second period. Rather, a 
stockholder must contract for a single revenue share for each firm 
that will remain the same under each state of the world. 
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Definition 3.5. A stock ownership program z e Z is constrained Pareto 
optimal if there does not exist a stock ownership program z e Z, such 
i( i( . h( h( that U ci) L. U ci) for all 1 i I and U ch) > U ch) for some hi I. 
Theorem 3 .S: (Optimality) • • • • • If Cm , c  ,& , (p0, p  )),
p� = 1, m: = (x:, a:) e R21, i  i I, is a participation equilibrium
relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism, then the equilibrium stock 
• ownership program z • • • (x , c  ,& ) is constrained Pareto optimal. 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an attainable 
Pareto superior stock ownership program z e Z. 
• • • • • Since (z , (p0, p  ), (ai, i  i I) ) where ai a� is a full1 
stockholders equilibrium by Theorem 3 .3 ,  it follows by hypothesis from 
• • • Definition 3 .4 (ii) that, ciO + p ei + aix L ciO 
• • • • • • • and chO + p eh + ahx > chO + p eh + ahx some h.
(iv)-(vi), summing over stockholders gives, 
>ciO + l x .  > l c:o + l x� t J J 1 J J 
• • • • + p ei + aix all i
By Definition 3 .4 
and ) c:0 + l x� = l wi' which imply l ciO + l x. ) w, a contradictiont J J 1 1 J J 
since w is the total of resources available for current consumption 
and input into production.II 
To prove that the Shared Cost Mechanism is unbiased, we use an 
unbiasedness theorem proven by Dreze (1974, p,144) and the equivalence 
of the sets of stockholders equilibria and full stockholders 
equilibria. 
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Theorem 3 ,6: (Dreze) If z* s Z is a constrained Pareto optimal stock
ownership program, such that ciO > 0 for all i i I then there exist I
• • • • • vectors ni. ii I and prices (p0, p  ), p0 = 1 that support z as a
stockholders equilibrium. 
• Theorem 3 .7: z a Z is a stockholders equilibrium if and only if 
z* e Z can be supported as a full stockholders equilibrium stock
ownership program. 
The proof of Theorem 3 .7 follows immediately from the proof of 
Theorem 3 . 2. Using Theorems 3 .6, 3 .7. and 3 .3.  one can show, 
Theorem 3 ,8: If z• e Z is a constrained Pareto optimal stock ownership
program, such that ciO > 0 for all i i I, then there exist messages
• • • • mi= (xi, ai), i i I. and prices (p0, p  ), Po = 1 that support z as a
participation equilibrium relative to the Shared Cost Mechanism, 
4 I INFORMATION. TECHNOLOGIBS AND OPTIMALITY 
The implication of Theorems 3 .5 ,  3 .7 and 3.3 that every 
stockholders equilibrium in our model is constrained Pareto optimal is 
of particular interest. Using a more general model, Dreze [1974] 
exhibits three examples of stockholders equilibria that are not 
constrained Pareto optima, each illustrating a different feature of 
his model that can lead to inefficient equilibrium stock ownership 
programs. In this section, we show that none of these features can 
cause difficulties in our model, thus reconciling the apparently 
contrary optimality results. Our model is a special case of the 
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Dreze model, so the Dreze existence theorem remains valid. 
One of the Dreze examples [1974, p. 151,  ex. 4.4 ] exploits the 
non-differentiability of utility functions and can be dismissed 
immediately in view of assumption Al. The remaining examples arise 
because of informational imperfections that may prevent adjustment 
away from certain types of inefficient stock ownership programs once 
they have been attained. These adjustment problems can exist only 
when each firm is able to employ resources in more than one production 
activity, and this is not possible in our model. 
The only decision open to a firm in our model is the choice of 
a scale of activity; each firm is identified with a single production 
activity, and, for each input level, the firm's  output level is fully 
determined by the state of the world. Dreze, on the other hand, 
permits firms to choose production activities as well as input levels, 
and a firm may, in fact, use more than one activity although inputs 
used in one activity cannot also be used in another activity. Thus, 
in the Dreze framework, if a stockholder possesses only local 
information about a firm's production possibilities, the consequences 
can be more serious than in our model since the stockholder would be 
ignorant of possible tradeoffs between activities. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example given 
by Dreze (1974, p. 146, ex.4.1). There are two states (t and s), two 
stockholders (i and h) and two firms (j and k) . Preferences for the 
stockholders are given for fixed current consumption ciO and chO' and
thus are represented by indifference curves in the space of future 
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consumption for the two states o f  the world. The input quantity 
available to each firm is fixed: xj = 1 = xk' so that
ciO + chO + 2 = w. Stockholders' preferences are represented by
curves ii and hh, and firms' production possibilities by the triangles 
Otjsj and Otksk. Each firm has available to it two distinct
activities R(•) and P(•), each of which yield output in only one state 
of the world: 
Rjt(xj) = pjs(xj) = �t(xk) pks(xk) O, all xj' �·
R. (1) JS sj, pjt(l) tj' �s(l) sk.' Pkt(l) tk..
Thus each firm's production possibilities frontier F(·), given the 
fixed input available, represents the tradeoff between output in state 
s and output in state t and each firm's input must be divided between 
its activities: 
F. (1) J 
Fk(l)
{(Rjs(xjR), Pjt(xjP)) e R
21xjR + xjP = 1}. 
{(�s(xkR)' Pkt(xk.P)) B R
21xk.R + xk.P = 1). 
Let & . . = 1 = 9hk, in which case &.k = 0 = &h . •  Then, in � 1 J 
Figure l, an inefficient equilibrium stock ownership program occurs 
when xjR = 1 = xkP. The inefficiency is obvious. Both stockholders
can be made better off by exchanging revenue shares so that 
&ik = 1 = 9hj' in which case the firms would value maximize at
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Pt(xt) 
t. J 
ii 
k tk 
Rs(xs) s. J 
sk 
Figure l 
xjP = 1 = xkR given the input constraints xj
small moves are not profitable. 
1 xk. Notice that
The difficulty is one of information: each firm produces 
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optimally given the preferences of its owner , and each stockholder 
carries an optimal portfolio given the production plans of the firms. 
Clearly, if the stockholders know the production sets of both firms, 
this situation cannot arise. If firms consider the line tksj to be an
opportunity line that provides information about the direction of 
desirable changes in production plans, then they may reasonably alter 
their production plans with the expectation that optimal portfolio 
changes will follow. Although it is reasonable to believe that firms 
can observe the production plans of other firms, Dreze [1974] 
considers two variations of the above example, one where the 
opportunity line tksj is missing so that firms lack the information
which justifies changing their production plans in the previous 
example, and one where the opportunity line provides misleading 
information so that the adjusting firm can actually force the economy 
away from a constrained Pareto optimal allocation. 
In our model, these difficulties cannot arise because firms 
cannot effect a tradeoff between activities (since each firm has only 
one productive activity available to it). We observe, however, that 
the inefficiency shown in Figure 1 can be generated by unbundling the 
activities and associating a distinct firm with each possible 
activity. In this instance, there would be four firms, each of which 
could produce in only one of the two states of the world. But, this 
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would violate Assumption A2 of our model since each firm would have a 
constant zero marginal productivity for one state of the world, namely 
the state in which the firm does not produce. 
5 • CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have developed a general decision making 
framework that formalizes the notion of communication between agents 
in the conventional stock market model. This enables us to 
rigorously examine the equilibrium properties of alternative 
behavioral objectives for guiding the behavior of firms within a 
single model of stock market economies. This model also requires that 
investors be given at least a naive incentive to communicate the 
information required for an efficient decision. Finally we 
demonstrated the general existence and optimality for participation 
equilibria which includes the equilibria in the Leland, Eker:n:-Wilson, 
Diamond, and Helpma:n:-Razin models whenever they exist. 
The general model without activity choice has not really been 
distinguished in the literature from the model with activity choice. 
As a consequence, all existing optimality theorems for equilibrium 
stock market allocations are attributed to highly restrictive 
conditions such as the spanning condition in Leland and Eker:n:-Wilson, 
multiplicative uncertainty in Diamond, and a very special decision 
mechanism in Helpman-Razin. Our results show that, in fact, the 
optimality of the equilibrium allocations in each of these models is 
due to the lack of activity choice. 
The significance of this observation is further enhanced by 
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the work of Grossman-Hart (1979) who introduced a new concept of 
efficiency for stock market models called production social Nash 
optimality. One of the motivations for this concept was to exhibit a 
reasonable notion of efficiency for which the sets of efficient 
allocations and equilibrium allocations in stock market economies 
would coincide. Yet, the technological structure assumed by 
Grossman-Hart in their introductory mode110 is the same as that which
we assume in this paper so that the set of constrained Pareto optimal 
allocations itself coincides with the set of equilibrium allocations, 
provided sufficient freedom is allowed in the assignment of cost 
shares to obtain existence in genera1.11
Another interesting comparison of our development to 
Grossman-Hart (1979) is possible if were view the notion of a full 
stockholders equilibrium as a shareholding equilibrium (i. e. cost 
shares = revenue shares) with sidepayments. Grossman-Hart justify a 
value maximization criteria for firms on the basis of the existence of 
sidepayments (in terms of period 0 income transfers) from those 
shareholders who favor a change in a firm ' s  production plan to those 
who do not, such that all shareholders are made better off. They do 
not, however, permit these sidepayments to be made but rather assume 
that the manager of the firm has knowledge of the set of contingent 
claim prices of each shareholder and may perform this computation 
directly. 
As the examples in section 2 illustrate, an equilibrium in our 
framework will generally require stockholders to receive revenue 
shares 0 ..  that do not coincide with their cost share a . . • If we1J 1J 
define a ij aij 0 . .  and note that� 
Pj0ij + aijxj = (pj + xj)eij + aijxj
41 
where ' .a . .  = 0 for all j, then we may interpret our equilibrium as a L1 � 
shareholding equilibrium with sidepayments a . .  x . •  The Shared Cost� J 
Mechanism then represents a specific decision procedure that 
implements these equilibria, and may be viewed as a modified 
Shareholding Mechanism where, in order to ensure shareholder unanimity 
with respect to firm j's input decision, a . .  x. is the period 0 income� J 
transfer to shareholder i.12
Finally, the Shared Cost Mechanism, the Paired Difference 
Mechanism and the Quadratic Mechanism exhibit the same equilibrium 
properties when applied to stock market economies with an incomplete 
set of contingent markets as they do when applied to private ownership 
economies with public goods. In particular, the Shared Cost Mechanism 
is efficient, unbiased and individually rational. It is also not 
individually feasible away from equilibrium. Th.is and the fact that 
the concept of a full stockholders equilibrium is a clear analog of a 
Lindahl equilibrium for stock ownership economies reinforces the 
analytical similarity between public good economies and stockownership 
economies first noted by Dreze (1974). 
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FOO'INOTES 
1. Dreze (1978) and others have noted the public good nature of
equilibria in stockholders' ownership economies: in equilibrium,
no stockholder desires a (local) change of a firm's  input-output
decision. The participation approach to these economies implicit
in virtually all the voting or collective decision schemes
considered in the literature enhances the public aspect of the
problem. 
2. Hart (1977) has suggested that the Condorcet paradox which arises
under majority rule is not a definitive objection to the rule
because it does not account for informational difficulties that
can prevent the formation of majority coalitions. However, as
Jordan (1979) points out, if the majority coal ition is a single
stockholder, then Hart's caveat is inappropriate. Jordan' s
(1979) concept of controlling interest is a ref inement of the
concept of majority control that builds on the notion of single
stockholder control. 
3 .  There do exist examples without spanning which have an 
equilibrium relative to the Shareholding Mechanism. These 
examples, however, all use a restricted class of preference 
profiles. Leland' s  necessity result relies upon using a general 
class of profiles. 
4. A function f(x ) is said to be semi-strictly quasi-concave if
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f(x1) 2.. f(x2) implies f(lx1 + (1 - l )x2) 2.. fCx2) , 0  i l i 1.
and 
f C x1) > f(x
2> implies f(lx1 + (1 - l ) x2) > f Cx2) ,  0 < l < 1.
5 .  The equilibrium condition that the second period consumption in 
each state of this world equals total output in that state, i. e. , 
l c!
1 
l R�(xj) ,  for all s, is unnecessary since it is assured by
J 
(iii) , (iv) , and (v) . 
6. In the Helpman-Razin formulation each individual pays the same
fraction a� = 1/1 of the cost of his own input proposal, m . . •J �
Requiring each individual to pay a fraction of each firms total 
cost eliminates the need for lump sum transfers to achieve a 
balanced budget in their model. 
7. Generic non-existence relative to the Helpman-Razin Mechanism can
be similarly demonstrated for the class of economies that satisfy
the Ekern-Wilson spanning condition.
8. Definition. The Quadratic Mechanism is defined by,
( i) M = R-1°, (ii) 
Ci/m> = aijl 
1 
mij
xj = l mij1 
l'.f l-1 + 2LI(mij 
1 
2(1-1 ) (1-2) Ji h�'/ i  (mhj 
y ) 0 and l aij 
1 
1 each j.
for each j, and (iii) 
1 ) 2 
- 1-1 �i 
mhj) 
mh' j>
2] for all i and each
9. Definition. The Paired Difference Uechanism is defined by,
where 
( i) M = if . ( ii) x. = l m . .  for each j, and (iii)J 1 1J 
Cij(m) = [t + mi+2, j - mi+l ,j] l mij where I + 11 
I + 2 2 for each j and all i. 
10. See sections 2 and 3 of Grossman-Hart (1978).
1 and 
11 . It should be noted that Grossman-Hart (1979) use an objective 
function for firms which differs from that which we use here. 
They have firms maximizing net value relative to initial 
shareholders rather than final shareholders. 
12. Hart [1977] has shown that the use of sidepayments makes the
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existence of a majority rule equilibrium less likely than without
them, where his definition of majority excludes unanimity .
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